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Abstract 
Defending against denial-of-service attacks (DoS) in a mobile ad hoc 
network  (MANET)  is  challenging  because  of  the  dynamic network 
topology.  Security  primitives  must  be  dynamically  adjusted  to  cope 
with the network. The Reduction-of-Quality (RoQ) Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS) attack is one which throttles the tcp throughput 
heavily  and  reduces  the  quality-of-service  (QoS)  to  end  systems 
gradually  rather  than  refusing  the  clients  from  the  services 
completely.  Supporting  QoS  in  MANET  is  a  challenging  task, 
particularly  in  the  presence  of  malicious  users.  In  this  paper,  we 
propose a DoS resilient technique that uses a flow table to detect the 
attackers. The proposed defense mechanism identifies the attackers 
based on the congestion bit notification and asks the sending node to 
reduce  the  sending  rate.  Once  the  attackers  are  identified,  all  the 
packets from those nodes will be blocked. The throughput and delay 
performance of TCP or UDP flows are very sensitive to such RoQ 
attacks. Through extensive ns2 network simulations, we demonstrate 
the  achievement  of  high  throughput  and  low  delay  for  a  network 
under the RoQ attack. 
Keywords: 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a system of wireless 
mobile  nodes  that  dynamically  self-organize  in  arbitrary  and 
temporary  network topologies. In the  mobile ad hoc network, 
nodes can directly communicate with all the other nodes within 
their  radio  ranges;  whereas  nodes  that  not  in  the  direct 
communication range use intermediate node(s) to communicate 
with each other. The mobile adhoc network does not provide the 
secure boundary to protect the network from some potentially 
dangerous network accesses. Lack of secure boundaries makes 
the mobile ad hoc network susceptible to the attacks. 
A  DDoS attack is a  large-scale, coordinated attack on the 
availability of services at a victim system or network resource. 
The  DDoS  attack  is  launched  by  sending  an  extremely  large 
volume of packets to a target machine through the simultaneous 
cooperation  of  a  large  number  of  hosts  that      are  distributed 
throughout  the  network.  The  attack  traffic  consumes  the 
bandwidth resources of the network or the computing resource at 
the target host, so that legitimate requests will be discarded. The 
only viable approach is to design defense mechanism that will 
detect the attack and respond to it by dropping the excess traffic. 
Generally it is easy to detect the abnormal behavior of attack 
near the victim. However, it is also often too late to detect the 
DDoS attack at the victim network. The attack should ideally be 
stopped  as  close  to  the  sources  as  possible  to  save  network 
resources  and  to  reduce  congestion.  However,  there  are  no 
common characteristics of DDoS streams  that can be used to 
detect the attacks near the source. To balance this tradeoff, in 
this paper we try to detect the DDoS attacks in the intermediate 
network. 
RoQ attacks are a new class of attacks that target adaptation 
mechanisms  employed  in  current  computing  systems  and 
networks. Denial of Service relies on overwhelming the victim 
with load that constantly exceeds its capacity. RoQ attacks, on 
the  other  hand,  optimize  the  attack  traffic  to  produce  the 
maximum  damage,  while  keeping  a  low  profile  to  avoid 
detection. RoQ attacks are low rate TCP attacks in which the 
attacker  sends  periodic  attack  pulses  to  overflow  a  router’s 
buffer  and  force  the  legitimate  TCP  traffic  flow  to  low 
throughput. The RoQ attack is shown in Fig.1.   
We consider a RoQ attack comprising a burst of M packets 
(or  bytes)  transmitted  at  the  rate  of  δ  packets  (or  bytes)  per 
second over a short period of time τ, where M = δτ. This process 
is repeated every T units of time. We call M the magnitude of 
the attack, δ the amplitude of the attack, τ the duration of the 
attack,  and  T  the  period  of  the  attack.  Typically  τ  should  be 
much smaller than T. Thus the RoQ attack traffic, I(t), at time t 
is given by: 
 
δ, t mod T
It
0 otherwise
  
 

 
 
Fig.1. RoQ attack 
By synchronizing the attacking period to the Retransmission 
Time Out (RTO) duration, the attacker can force TCP flows on 
congested link to frequently enter a time out state and leads to 
low throughput. Since the RoQ attack provides the freedom of 
varying attack parameters (δ, τ and T) causing different levels of 
damage and also it allows the zombies traffic to go unnoticed by 
having average attack traffic of M/ T that is much lower than the 
peak rate δ, the low rate attack traffic is more advantageous to an 
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2.  RELATED WORK 
Fei Xing et al. [1] have proposed a model to characterize the 
evolution of node behaviors. They have analyzed the network 
survivability in the presence of node misbehaviours and failures. 
The impact of node behaviours was used as a guideline to design 
a  survivable  ad  hoc  network  with  the  given  predefined 
survivability  preference.  But  in  their  proposed  model,  node 
misbehaviours may improve network performance in terms of 
end-to-end delays in some scenarios. Chia-Wei Chang et al. [4] 
proposed protection mechanism for defending against a low rate 
DDoS attack. Their proposed scheme identifies TCP victims by 
monitoring  their  drop  rates  and  preferentially  admits  those 
packets  from  the  victims  with  high  drop  rates  to  the  output 
queue.  This  is  to  ensure  that  well-behaved  TCP  sessions  can 
retain  their  bandwidth  shares.  The  protection  scheme  can  be 
readily deployable on top of existing router mechanisms. But, 
their  proposed  method  focuses  on  protecting  victims  without 
explicitly  identifying  attackers.  In  the  paper  on  Pulsing  RoQ 
DDoS Attack [6] a detection scheme that monitors three MAC 
layer signals and a response scheme based on ECN marking are 
discussed. In this paper, the method of monitoring the sending 
rates  of  the  nodes  is  not  discussed.  Hence  identifying  the 
attacking  nodes  becomes  a  problem.  It  may  also  result  in 
increase of false positives and false negatives. Xiapu Luo et al. 
[7] have presented the important problem of detecting pulsing 
denial of service (PDoS) attacks which send a sequence of attack 
pulses  to  reduce  TCP  throughput.  Their  proposed  detection 
method  can  detect  polymorphic  DoS  (PMDoS)  attacks  which 
may  exhibit  various  traffic  patterns  that  cannot  be  easily 
detected. 
Arunmozhi  et  al.  [26]  have  proposed  a  defense  scheme 
against RoQ attack in MANET using flow monitoring table. In 
their proposed scheme the flow details are continuously updated 
which leads to more overhead and increased average end to end 
delay. Their proposed scheme [26] focuses mainly on traditional 
flooding based RoQ attacks with zero attack intervals. In this 
paper, it is proposed to develop a resilient scheme using a flow 
table which is updated at the RTO period of each packet. This 
reduces the overhead information and the average end to end 
delay.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  RoQ  attack  with  different 
attacking period. The impact of attack period is studied. 
3. PROPOSED DEFENSE SCHEME 
Security  is  essential  for  the  widespread  of  MANET. 
However, the characteristics of MANET pose both challenges 
and  opportunities  in  achieving  the  security  goals,  such  as 
confidentiality,  authentication,  integrity,  availability,  access 
control, and nonrepudiation.  A variety of security mechanisms 
have been invented to counter DDoS attacks. The conventional 
approaches  such  as  authentication,  access  control,  encryption, 
and digital signature provide a defense for wired and wireless 
networks. Since RoQ attacks are class of DDoS attack  which 
produces the maximum damage in MANET, we have proposed a 
defense mechanism to detect such attacks. 
In this paper, a resilient scheme against the RoQ attack is 
proposed.  According to the resilient scheme, the flow details are 
maintained  in  a  table  called  Flow  Table  (FT).  The  flow 
information includes flow ID, source ID, destination ID, the time 
at which the flow is updated, and packet sending rate. Sending 
rates are estimated for each flow in the intermediate nodes. The 
flow details are updated at every node at the estimated RTO of a 
packet.  The updated flow information is sent to the destination 
along  with  each  flow.  When  congestion  is  detected  by 
intermediate  node,  it  starts  marking  the  Explicit  Congestion 
Notification  (ECN)  in  the  IP  header  of  the  packet.  When  the 
destination node gets this congestion notification, it sends the 
ECN by  setting the congestion bit to  notify the  sender  nodes 
about  the  congestion.  The  sender  nodes,  upon  seeing  these 
packets with ECN marking, will then reduce their sending rate. 
If the sender nodes do not reduce their sending rate, it leads to 
severe congestion.  The updated flow details of destination are 
used to find the source node which leads the congestion. The 
previous  sending  rate  of  a  flow  is  checked  with  its  current 
sending rate. When both the rates are same, the corresponding 
sender of the flow is considered as an attacker. This is because 
the sending node did not follow the rate control. Once the DDoS 
attackers are identified, all the packets from those nodes will be 
discarded. The ID of the attacking node is sent to all the nodes to 
inform all the nodes to completely remove the attacker from the 
network. 
Every  intermediate  node  is  associated  with  an  admission 
controller. The admission controller at the source node sends a 
probing request packet towards the destination node to assess the 
end to end bandwidth availability. This is a control packet that 
contains a bottleneck bandwidth field. Each intermediate node 
on the path between the source-destination pair that receives the 
probing request packet updates the bottleneck bandwidth field in 
the packet if the bandwidth availability at the node is less than 
the current value of the field. On receiving the probing request 
packet,  the  destination  node  sends  a  probing  response  packet 
back to the source node with the bottleneck field copied from the 
received  probing  request  packet.  After  receiving  the  response 
message,  the  source  node  admits  the  traffic  flow  only  if 
sufficient end to end bandwidth is available. 
Each  node  continuously  estimates  the  locally  available 
bandwidth.  The  MAC  layer  signals  such  as  frequency  of 
receiving  RTS/CTS  packets,  frequency  of  sensing  a  busy 
channel  and  the  number  of  RTS/DATA  retransmissions  are 
monitored by all the nodes. If the MAC layer signals exceed the 
threshold levels, the network is congested. When a node detects 
congestion or overload conditions, it starts marking the ECN bits 
in  the  IP  header  of  the  packets.  If  the  destination  receives  a 
packet  with  ECN  bits  marked,  it  notifies  the  source  using  a 
regulate message. After receiving a regulate message, the source 
node initiates reestablishment of its session based on its original 
bandwidth requirements by sending a probe request packet to the 
destination. A source node terminates the session if the available 
end to end bandwidth cannot meet its bandwidth requirements. If 
the node detecting violations marks the ECN bits of all packets, 
then  all  sessions  passing  through  this  node  are  forced  to 
reestablish their connections at the same instance.  
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2.  Each node maintains a flow table which contains sender 
ID, destination ID, flow ID, flow update time and packet 
sending rate. 
3.  Each  node  updates  the  flow  details  from  its  one  hop 
neighbors at RTO period of each packet. 
4.  Admission control is adopted by the source node. 
5.  Based  on  the  admission  control  mechanism,  the  traffic 
flows  are  transmitted  from  the  source  nodes  to  the 
destinations. 
6.  MAC layer signals are checked with the threshold values 
for the occurrence of congestion. 
7.  If congestion occurs, ECN is marked and the source node is 
informed to apply the rate control mechanism. 
8.  From the updated flow details of the one hop neighbor, the 
source  nodes  are  checked  whether  they  follow  the  rate 
control or not. 
9.  The  Normal  Nodes  follow  the  rate  control  whereas  the 
node which does not follow the rate control is identified as 
the Attacker Node. 
10. The ID of the Attacker Node is sent as the control message 
to all the nodes in the network for completely blocking the 
node. 
4.  SIMULATION 
The  network  simulator  ns2  is  used  to  simulate  the 
experiment. In simulation, the channel capacity of mobile nodes 
is set to the value of 2 Mbps. This section includes simulation 
parameters, simulation environment and simulation results. 
4.1  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
The  parameter  settings  for  the  simulations  are:  the  radio 
propagation  mode  is  TwoRay  Ground,  antenna  type  is  omni 
antenna,  interface  queue  length  is  50  (packets),  queue 
management scheme is  Drop Tail, height of antenna is 1.5m, 
signal interference or sensing distance is 550m. Other simulation 
parameters are listed in Table.1. 
Table.1. Simulation Parameters 
No. of  Nodes    100 
Area Size   1000 X 1000 
Mac   802.11 
Radio Range  250m 
Simulation Time   300 sec 
Traffic Source  CBR 
Packet Size  512 
Mobility Model  Random Way Point 
Attackers  2,4,6 and 8  
Pause time  10 sec 
Routing Protocol  AODV 
 
4.2  SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
The UDP traffic flows are established in the network. All the 
source nodes negotiate a rate of 100 kbps for traffic flow  and 
begin sending packets on flow at a rate of 100 kbps at time t = 
1.0 sec.  The attacking flow is set at a rate of 600 kbps. The RoQ 
attack flow is established with an attack rate (δ) of 600kb over 
the short period of time (τ) 0.1sec and the period of the attack 
(T) is 1.0 sec. The capacity of the link is set to 1 Mbps. Each 
simulation run lasts for 300 s in order to allow the network to 
experience some levels of congestion. 
4.3  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The  simulation  is  carried  out  in  2  scenarios.  In  the  first 
scenario, three traffic flows are established in the network. The 
number  of  attacking  flow  is  initially  set  as  2  and  the  attack 
period of the attack is varied from 1 sec to 5 secs. The packet 
delivery ratio at the destination node is obtained and then the 
number  of  attacking  flows  is  varied  and  the  throughput  and 
Average End to End Delay are obtained.  
 
Fig.2. Packet Delivery Ratio with different Period of Attack 
From the simulation results of Fig.2, it is observed that if the 
attacking  period  of  the  RoQ  attack  is  increased,  the  packet 
delivery ratio can be increased. The packet delivery ratio is the 
ratio of the number of packets received successfully to the total 
number  of  packets  sent.  For  the  attacking  period  of  1  sec, 
87.14%  of  packet  delivery  ratio  is  achieved.  If  the  attacking 
period  is  increased  to  5  secs,  the  packet  delivery  ratio  is 
increased  to  90.92%.  This  reveals  that  if  the  burst  of  attack 
occurs with a smaller value of T, the attack traffic occurs more 
often  than  with  the  case  of  greater  value  of  T.  As  the  attack 
traffic is increased, the packet delivery ratio is reduced. 
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Fig.3. Average Throughput with different attacking flow 
Fig.3  shows  that  when  the  number  of  attacking  flows  is 
increased the average throughput is reduced. The throughput is 
the  volume  of  data  successfully  received  by  the  receiver  in 
Mbps. Since the proposed scheme is able to detect the attacker, 
effectively based on the flow details and is able to block the 
attacking  flow.  We  are  able  to  achieve  up  to  95.5%  of 
throughput for 10 attacking flows as against 40.2% in normal 
network scenario. 
 
Fig.4. Average End to End Delay Vs Attackers 
Fig.4  shows  that  when  the  number  of  attacking  flows  is 
increased, the average end to end delay incurred is increased. 
The  average  end  to  end  delay  calculates  the  delay  of  all  the 
packets which have been successfully transmitted from source to 
the  destination.  It  includes  all  possible  delays  caused  by 
buffering  during  route  discovery  latency,  queuing  in  the 
interface queue, retransmission delays at the MAC, propagation 
and transfer times. Since the attacking flows are rejected in the 
proposed scheme based on the flow state information at every 
node, we are able to achieve the lower value of average end to 
end delay. It is observed that with the proposed scheme we are 
able to achieve the delay increment of 22.17% for 10 attacking 
flows without which 36.47% of delay could be achieved.  
In the second scenario, the number of UDP flows are varied, 
the  Packet  Delivery  Ratio  &  Average  End  to  End  Delay  is 
obtained. The offered load could be varied by changing the CBR 
packet size, the number of CBR flows or the CBR packet rate. 
Fig. 5 shows that as the number of flows is increased, the packet 
delivery ratio gets reduced. As the offered load is increased, the 
packet delivery ratio is reduced due to the network congestion. 
Since distributed rate control is applied in the proposed scheme, 
we are able to achieve the packet delivery ratio of 70.38% for 7 
CBR  traffic  flows.  It  is  observed  that  without  the  proposed 
scheme we are able to achieve only 29.22% of packet delivery 
ratio. Fig. 6 shows that as the number of UDP flows is increased 
the average end to end delay is also increased due to the same 
reason.  However  with  the  proposed  system  we  are  able  to 
achieve less delay. 
In  addition,  the  proposed  scheme  works  well  along  with 
different  routing  protocols.  Since  mobility  causes  frequent 
network topology changes, routing is difficult in MANET. When 
the nodes move, the established paths may break and the routing 
protocols  must  dynamically  search  for  other  feasible  routes. 
Hence,  the  proposed  method  is  experimented  with  both 
proactive and reactive protocols. Ad hoc On-demand Distance 
Vector  (AODV)  and  Dynamic  Source  Routing  (DSR)  are  the 
reactive protocols which use an on-demand approach for finding 
routes. In reactive protocols, route is established only when it is 
required  by  a  source  node  for  transmitting  data  packets. 
Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) is one of the 
proactive  routing  protocols  which  maintain  routes  to  all 
destinations,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  these  routes  are 
needed. Fig. 7 shows the compatibility of working the proposed 
scheme with different routing protocols such as AODV, DSDV   
and DSR.   
 
Fig.5. Average End to End Delay with variable number of UDP 
flows 
0
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
2 4 6 8 10
T
h
r
o
u
g
h
p
u
t
No. of  Attackers
THROUGHPUT VS ATTACKERS
PROPOSED
WITH ATTACK
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
2 4 6 8 10
D
e
l
a
y
(
s
e
c
)
No. of Attackers
DELAY VS ATTACKERS
PROPOSED
WITH ATTACK
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
D
e
l
a
y
(
s
e
c
)
No. of flows
DELAY VS NO. OF FLOWS
PROPOSED
WITH ATTACKS A ARUNMOZHI AND Y VENKATARAMANI: RESILIENT SCHEME AGAINST REDUCTION OF QUALITY (ROQ) DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACK IN MANET 
410 
 
Fig.6. Packet Delivery Ratio with variable number of UDP 
flows 
 
Fig.7. Compatibility with different routing protocols 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper an effective resilient scheme against RoQ DDoS 
attack in MANET is developed. The proposed scheme detects 
the attacker based on the flow information updated at the RTO 
period of packets and the congestion bit information. Once the 
attackers are identified, all the packets from the attacking nodes 
will be discarded. The network resources are made available to 
the legitimate users. The RoQ attack is analyzed for different 
attack periods. Network simulation experiment on RoQ attack 
shows that greater throughput and packet delivery ratio can be 
achieved  with  the  proposed  scheme.  Increase  in  delay  and 
decrease in throughput can be observed especially when large 
number of attacks occurs. The proposed scheme also shows the 
compatibility of working with different routing protocols. 
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